Russian Procurement Plans and the Aviation Sector: Difference between revisions
Created page with "'''Date:''' April 9th, 2020 at 15:00 CEST / 09:00 EST '''Platform:''' Zoom Webinar === Link to Video Recording === *Recording will be made available soon.* === Connection Instructions === Use the registration link to register through Zoom. The webinar can be viewed either through the downloaded software (non-government computer), in the browser through Chrome (government computer), or through apps for both Android and Apple platforms. === Presentation Summary ===..." |
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'''Platform:''' Zoom Webinar | '''Platform:''' Zoom Webinar | ||
=== Link to Video Recording === | === Link to Video Recording === | ||
[https://eucom.webex.com/eucom/ldr.php?RCID=de78b84d0e484e4e270cabca3b592d5e Link to Video Recording] | |||
'''Recording Password:''' dgMgDgpQ628 | |||
=== Connection Instructions === | === Connection Instructions === | ||
Latest revision as of 13:38, 18 August 2025
Date: April 9th, 2020 at 15:00 CEST / 09:00 EST Platform: Zoom Webinar
Link to Video Recording
Link to Video Recording Recording Password: dgMgDgpQ628
Connection Instructions
Use the registration link to register through Zoom. The webinar can be viewed either through the downloaded software (non-government computer), in the browser through Chrome (government computer), or through apps for both Android and Apple platforms.
Presentation Summary
In 2020, Russia completed its ten-year state armaments program (GPV-2020), which was intended to resolve deficiencies revealed in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. GPV-2020 focused on modernizing Russia's military equipment, with the Navy and Air Force receiving the bulk of funds.
Russia's new state armament program through 2027 prioritizes Airborne and Ground Forces relevant to both large-scale conventional conflicts and smaller Syria-type expeditionary operations. The new armament plan suggests no major changes in Russian foreign policy or defense thinking.
In the new state armaments program, procurement of new equipment will fall. To keep defense industries stable amid declining state orders, the Russian government is encouraging defense firms to sell to the civilian sector. FPRI examined this effort via a case study of the aviation sector.
The Kremlin and state-owned defense contractor Rostec have both prioritized aviation as a sector that can successfully sell to civilian markets at home and abroad. In practice, this hasn't worked. The SJ-100 Superjet has flopped abroad, while the MS-21 remains years behind schedule. Civilian sales are unlikely to bolster the profitability of Russia's aviation firms. Even if Russia cuts procurement of military aviation, as planned, the government will still be left paying to keep plane producers in business.
About the Presenter
Chris Miller
Title: Director, Eurasia Program Affiliation: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI); Assistant Professor of International History, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University
Chris Miller specializes in Russian politics, foreign policy, and economics. His most recent book is Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia, which has been reviewed in publications such as The Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, and the Times Literary Supplement.
He is also the author of The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and the Collapse of the USSR (2016). Miller is a regular contributor to publications such as Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, the Wall Street Journal, and The American Interest. He holds a Ph.D. from Yale University and a B.A. from Harvard University.