RSI 2020 Calendar: Difference between revisions
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|| 31: Putin and the Pandemic | || 31: [[Putin and the Pandemic]] | ||
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! April !! May !! June | ! April !! May !! June | ||
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| 02: Contemporary Russian Approaches to Deterrence | | 02: [[Contemporary Russian Approaches to Deterrence]] | ||
07: Putin and Russia's Constitutional Reform | 07: [[Putin and Russia's Constitutional Reform]] | ||
09: Russian Procurement Plans and the Aviation Sector | 09: [[Russian Procurement Plans and the Aviation Sector]] | ||
14: Russia-China Cooperation: Is it real or just fantasy? | 14: [[Russia-China Cooperation: Is it real or just fantasy?]] | ||
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|| 04: Russia's Strategy Towards the War in Eastern Ukraine | || 04: [[Russia's Strategy Towards the War in Eastern Ukraine]] | ||
11: The Spoiler: The Systemic Roots of Russian Revisionism | 11: [[The Spoiler: The Systemic Roots of Russian Revisionism]] | ||
18: Russia's National Strategic Goals - The Influence of the 1990s | 18: [[Russia's National Strategic Goals - The Influence of the 1990s]] | ||
25: Putin's Dark Ecosystem: Graft, Gangsters, and Geopolitics | 25: [[Putin's Dark Ecosystem: Graft, Gangsters, and Geopolitics]] | ||
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! July !! August!! September | ! July !! August!! September | ||
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| 01: The impact of COVID-19 on the Russian armed forces and the military industry | | 01: [[The impact of COVID-19 on the Russian armed forces and the military industry]] | ||
14: Russia's Reassertion in the Asia-Pacific | 14: [[Russia's Reassertion in the Asia-Pacific]] | ||
15: Maritime Monday (1of7): The Sea in Russia's Strategic Future | 15: [[Maritime Monday (1of7): The Sea in Russia's Strategic Future]] | ||
16: Russia's Reassertion in the Asia-Pacific | 16: [[Russia's Reassertion in the Asia-Pacific]] | ||
20: Maritime Monday (2of7): Russia's New Naval Missions for Defense and Deterrence | 20: [[Maritime Monday (2of7): Russia's New Naval Missions for Defense and Deterrence]] | ||
23: Russia In The Age Of Digital Competition | 23: [[Russia In The Age Of Digital Competition]] | ||
27: Maritime Mondays (3of6): Russia’s Naval Theatres: High North to the Mediterranean | 27: [[Maritime Mondays (3of6): Russia’s Naval Theatres: High North to the Mediterranean]] | ||
29: Maritime Mondays (4of7): Russia's Naval Theatres: Pacific Ambitions and Their Implications | 29: [[Maritime Mondays (4of7): Russia's Naval Theatres: Pacific Ambitions and Their Implications]] | ||
30: Russia in Asia and Eurasia - Compare and Contrast of Russian Geographical Interests | 30: [[Russia in Asia and Eurasia - Compare and Contrast of Russian Geographical Interests]] | ||
|| 03: MM#5: Russian Naval Power Projection: Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, and the Shape of future Russian Naval Capabilities | || 03: [[MM#5: Russian Naval Power Projection: Aircraft Carriers, Submarines, and the Shape of future Russian Naval Capabilities]] | ||
06: Russia's Next Generation | 06: [[Russia's Next Generation]] | ||
10: MM#6: Russian Naval Rhetoric and Reality: Implication for U.S. and NATO Maritime Strategies | 10: [[MM#6: Russian Naval Rhetoric and Reality: Implication for U.S. and NATO Maritime Strategies]] | ||
17: Maritime Mondays (7of7) - Russia: What Kind of Maritime Power? | 17: [[Maritime Mondays (7of7) - Russia: What Kind of Maritime Power?]] | ||
20: Russia's National Strategic Goals Part II | 20: [[Russia's National Strategic Goals Part II]] | ||
21: Russia's Central Asian goals and Economic Capabilities | 21: [[Russia's Central Asian goals and Economic Capabilities]] | ||
24: Minsk and Moscow: Russia's responses to the Belarus crisis | 24: [[Minsk and Moscow: Russia's responses to the Belarus crisis]] | ||
25: Russian Strategic and Military Culture | 25: [[Russian Strategic and Military Culture]] | ||
27: Russian Transport Infrastructure and its Impact on Trade with Asian Partners | 27: [[Russian Transport Infrastructure and its Impact on Trade with Asian Partners]] | ||
31: Russian Strategic Culture, Transatlantic Security, & Coronavirus impacts on Russian Relations with Europe | 31: [[Russian Strategic Culture, Transatlantic Security, & Coronavirus impacts on Russian Relations with Europe]] | ||
|| 15: Russian Globally Integrated Operations (GIO) Part 1 Grand Strategy, Not Opportunism | || 15: [[Russian Globally Integrated Operations (GIO) Part 1 Grand Strategy, Not Opportunism]] | ||
16: Russian Globally Integrated Operation Part 2 How Moscow Maps the World | 16: [[Russian Globally Integrated Operation Part 2 How Moscow Maps the World]] | ||
18: The Russian Understanding of War | 18: [[The Russian Understanding of War]] | ||
21: Is Russia Winning? A Critical Assessment of the Putin Regime and Its Foreign Policy in Europe | 21: [[Is Russia Winning? A Critical Assessment of the Putin Regime and Its Foreign Policy in Europe]] | ||
22: Russian Globally Integrated Operations (GIO) Part 3: Polar Power - Russian Energy and Globally Integrated Operations | 22: [[Russian Globally Integrated Operations (GIO) Part 3: Polar Power - Russian Energy and Globally Integrated Operations]] | ||
24: Russian Globally Integrated Operations (GIO) Part4: Russia's Role as a Supplier of Strategically Important Goods | 24: [[Russian Globally Integrated Operations (GIO) Part4: Russia's Role as a Supplier of Strategically Important Goods]] | ||
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! October!! November!! December | ! October!! November!! December | ||
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|| 05: Understanding Russian Black Sea Power Dynamics Through National Security Gaming | || 05: [[Understanding Russian Black Sea Power Dynamics Through National Security Gaming]] | ||
19: From Victory to Defeat: Assessing the Russian Leadership's War Calculus | 19: [[From Victory to Defeat: Assessing the Russian Leadership's War Calculus]] | ||
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Revision as of 13:40, 6 August 2025
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